Post by account_disabled on Feb 24, 2024 23:58:01 GMT -5
If it is found that the re-estimation of revenue and expenditure may result in non-compliance with the fiscal result target established in the budget guidelines law, the amounts provided for in §§ and of this article may be reduced by up to the same proportion of the limitation applicable to all other discretionary expenses.”
As the level of contingency necessary to meet the goal of a balanced primary result (“zero deficit”) throughout tends to be high, Congress tries to bring forward the execution of its parliamentary amendments, in order to protect them from the effects the incidence of financial programming decrees controlled by the Executive.
It is not too much to reiterate that, in a year of municipal elections, the option to ensure that such amendments are passed on to the local bases of each federal deputy and each senator, before June , is a matter of political survival B2B Email List that does not allow for any restriction Supervisor. This is, in fact, an attempt to circumvent the prohibition inscribed in article , item VI, paragraph “a” of Law ,/ It is worth remembering that article of Amendment / provided for something similar in relation to previous municipal elections, to guarantee the effective financial transfer of % of the total special transfers (“budget pix”) until June ,
Norm that authorizes such a circumvention of the schedule written in the financial programming decree, but only a provision in the LDO/ vetoed by the Executive. If Congress overturns the veto, this is a debate that, of course, tends to be taken to the Federal Supreme Court, such is its fiscal and electoral repercussions in this imminent new round of tensions between the Executive and Legislative branches on budgetary matters.
If the LDO/ primary result target is not revised, parliamentary amendments must be contingent in the same proportion and at the same speed as other discretionary expenses. Advancing the budget execution of individual and bench amendments to ensure their payment by June would be placing exclusively on the Executive the colossal burden of carrying out the fiscal adjustment expected for the current year, which directly contravenes not only the already mentioned § of article of the Constitution, as well as § of the same constitutional provision: “ the budgetary schedules provided for in §§ and of this article will not be mandatory in cases of technical impediments ”.
As § of article of Complementary Law / provided that “ the minimum level of discretionary expenses necessary for the regular functioning of public administration is % (seventy-five percent) of the amount authorized in the respective annual budget law ”, the probable contingency margin for other discretionary expenses and, by table, for mandatory parliamentary amendments would be %.
In borderline reasoning, if there is a risk of revenue frustration (not least because Congress has rejected the Executive's efforts to review certain tax waivers) and, consequently, if there is a risk of not achieving the primary result target, a quarter of the Individual and bench parliamentary amendments may be subject to contingency. Stated even more directly, the scenario that can be projected for the financial programming is that of a potential limitation of commitment and payment of mandatory parliamentary amendments by up to R$ billion (i.e., / of R$ billion), making it also possible (although politically difficult) to fully contingency the commission amendments, whose veto in the LOA/ repositioned them at R$ billion.
As the level of contingency necessary to meet the goal of a balanced primary result (“zero deficit”) throughout tends to be high, Congress tries to bring forward the execution of its parliamentary amendments, in order to protect them from the effects the incidence of financial programming decrees controlled by the Executive.
It is not too much to reiterate that, in a year of municipal elections, the option to ensure that such amendments are passed on to the local bases of each federal deputy and each senator, before June , is a matter of political survival B2B Email List that does not allow for any restriction Supervisor. This is, in fact, an attempt to circumvent the prohibition inscribed in article , item VI, paragraph “a” of Law ,/ It is worth remembering that article of Amendment / provided for something similar in relation to previous municipal elections, to guarantee the effective financial transfer of % of the total special transfers (“budget pix”) until June ,
Norm that authorizes such a circumvention of the schedule written in the financial programming decree, but only a provision in the LDO/ vetoed by the Executive. If Congress overturns the veto, this is a debate that, of course, tends to be taken to the Federal Supreme Court, such is its fiscal and electoral repercussions in this imminent new round of tensions between the Executive and Legislative branches on budgetary matters.
If the LDO/ primary result target is not revised, parliamentary amendments must be contingent in the same proportion and at the same speed as other discretionary expenses. Advancing the budget execution of individual and bench amendments to ensure their payment by June would be placing exclusively on the Executive the colossal burden of carrying out the fiscal adjustment expected for the current year, which directly contravenes not only the already mentioned § of article of the Constitution, as well as § of the same constitutional provision: “ the budgetary schedules provided for in §§ and of this article will not be mandatory in cases of technical impediments ”.
As § of article of Complementary Law / provided that “ the minimum level of discretionary expenses necessary for the regular functioning of public administration is % (seventy-five percent) of the amount authorized in the respective annual budget law ”, the probable contingency margin for other discretionary expenses and, by table, for mandatory parliamentary amendments would be %.
In borderline reasoning, if there is a risk of revenue frustration (not least because Congress has rejected the Executive's efforts to review certain tax waivers) and, consequently, if there is a risk of not achieving the primary result target, a quarter of the Individual and bench parliamentary amendments may be subject to contingency. Stated even more directly, the scenario that can be projected for the financial programming is that of a potential limitation of commitment and payment of mandatory parliamentary amendments by up to R$ billion (i.e., / of R$ billion), making it also possible (although politically difficult) to fully contingency the commission amendments, whose veto in the LOA/ repositioned them at R$ billion.